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Abstract. In the tollbooth problem on trees, we are given a tree
T = (V,E) with n edges, and a set of m customers, each of whom is
interested in purchasing a path on the graph. Each customer has a ﬁxed
budget, and the objective is to price the edges of T such that the total
revenue made by selling the paths to the customers that can aﬀord them
is maximized. An important special case of this problem, known as the
highway problem, is when T is restricted to be a line. For the tollbooth
problem, we present an O(log n)-approximation, improving on the cur-
rent best O(log m)-approximation. We also study a special case of the
tollbooth problem, when all the paths that customers are interested in
purchasing go towards a ﬁxed root of T. In this case, we present an al-
gorithm that returns a (1 − )-approximation, for any  > 0, and runs
in quasi-polynomial time. On the other hand, we rule out the existence
of an FPTAS by showing that even for the line case, the problem is
strongly NP-hard. Finally, we show that in the discount model, when we
allow some items to be priced below zero to improve the overall proﬁt,
the problem becomes even APX-hard.
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of pricing the bandwidth along the links of a network
such that the revenue obtained from customers interested in buying bandwidth
along certain paths in the network is maximized. Suppose that each customer
declares a set of paths she is interested in buying, and a maximum amount
she is is willing to pay for each path. The network service provider’s objec-
tive is to assign single prices to the links such that the total revenue from
customers who can aﬀord to purchase their paths is maximized. Recently, nu-
merous papers have appeared on the computational complexity of such pricing
problems [1,6,5,7,8,9,10,11,12,15,13,16,17,18].
A special case of this problem, where each customer is interested in purchasing
only a single path (single-minded), and where there is no upper bound on the
number of customers purchasing each link (unlimited supply) was studied by
Guruswami et al. [16], under the name of tollbooth problem. The authors of [16]
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showed that the problem is already APX-hard when the network is restricted
to be a tree, and also presented a polynomial time algorithm for the case when
all paths start at a certain root of the tree. In [16], the authors also studied
the highway problem, a further restriction where the tree is a path, and gave
polynomial time algorithms when either the budgets are bounded and integral,
or all paths have a bounded length.
In this paper, we continue the study of these problems. For the tollbooth
problem, a uniform pricing gives an approximation factor of O(log n + logm),
where n and m are respectively the number of edges of the tree and the number
of customers. This result applies in fact for general sets [16], and not neces-
sarily paths of a network, and even in the non single-minded case [4]. Very
recently, and more generally, Cheung and Swamy [10] gave an algorithm that,
given any LP-based α-approximation algorithm for maximizing the social wel-
fare under limited supply, returns a solution with proﬁt within a factor of
α log umax of the maximum, where umax is the maximum supply of an item.
In particular, this gives an O(logm)-approximation for the tollbooth problem
on trees. In this paper, we give an O(log n)-approximation which is an improve-
ment over the O(logm) since n ≤ 3m can be always assumed (see Section 2).
While the problem is APX-hard even in the very simple case of a star [16],
we show that if all the paths are going towards (but not necessarily starting
at) a certain root, then a (1 − )-approximation can be obtained in quasi-
polynomial time. This result extends a recently developed quasi-PTAS [12] for
the highway problem, and uses essentially the same technique. However, there
is a number of technical issues that have to be resolved for this technique to
work on trees; most notably is the use of the Separator Theorem for trees,
and the modiﬁcation of the price-guessing strategy to allow only for one-sided
guesses.
The existence of a quasi-PTAS for the highway problem indicates that a PTAS
or even an FPTAS is still a possibility, since the problem was only known to be
weakly NP-hard [8]. In the last section of this paper, we show that the high-
way problem is indeed strongly NP-hard and hence admits no FPTAS unless
P=NP.
Balcan et al. [3] considered a model in which some items can be priced below
zero (in the form of a discount) so that the overall proﬁt is maximized. They
gave a 4-approximation for the uniform budgets case, and a quasi-PTAS for
a special case in which there is an optimal pricing that has only a bounded
number of negatively priced items. Here we show that the existence of a quasi-
PTAS in the general case is highly unlikely, by showing that the problem is
APX-hard.
In the next section, we give a formal deﬁnition of the problem. In Section 3, we
give an O(log n) approximation for trees and in Section 4 we give a quasi-PTAS
for the case of uncrossing paths. We describe our hardness results in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6. Due to lack of space, most proofs have been omitted
from this extended abstract.
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2 The Tollbooth Problem on Trees
2.1 Notation
Let T = (V,E) be a tree. We assume that we are given a (multi)set of paths
I = {I1, . . . , Im}, deﬁned on the set of edges E, where Ij = [sj , tj ] ⊆ E is the
path connecting sj and tj in T. For Ij ∈ I, we denote by B(Ij) ∈ R+ the budget
of path Ij , i.e., the maximum amount of money customer j is willing to pay
for purchasing path Ij . In the tollbooth problem, denoted henceforth by Tb, the
objective is to assign a price p(e) ∈ R+ for each edge e ∈ E, and to ﬁnd a subset
J ⊆ I, so as to maximize ∑I∈J p(I) subject to the budget constraints
p(I) ≤ B(I), for all I ∈ J , (1)
where, for I ∈ I, p(I) = ∑e∈I p(e).
For a node w ∈ V , let I[w] ⊆ I be the set of paths that pass through w. In
section 4, we will assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V . The depth
of T, denoted d(T), is the length of the longest path from the root r to a leaf.
For a node w ∈ V , we denote by T(w), the subtree of T rooted at w (excluding
the path from the parent of w to r), and for a subtree T′ of T we denote by
V (T′), E(T′) and I(T′) the vertex set, edge set, and set of intervals contained
completely in T′, respectively.
2.2 Preliminaries
In the following sections, we denote by p∗ : E → R+ an optimal set of prices,
and by Opt ⊆ I the set of intervals purchased in this optimum solution. For
a subset of intervals I ′ ⊆ I, and a price function p : E → R+, we denote by
p(I ′) = ∑I∈I′ p(I) the total price of intervals in I ′.
It easy to see that n ≤ 3m may be assumed without loss of generality. Indeed,
if we root the tree at some vertex r, then for every vertex v ∈ V , we may assume
that there is either an interval I ∈ I beginning at v or an interval I ∈ I that
passes through two diﬀerent children of v; otherwise, every interval through v
must contain its parent u (unless v = r in which case all edges incident to r can
be contracted), and hence we can contract the edge e = {u, v} and increase by
p∗(e) the prices of each the edges {v, v′} for each child v′ of v.
Let  > 0 be a given constant.
Proposition 1 ([12]). Let p∗ be an optimal solution for a given instance of Tb,
and  > 0 be a given constant. Then there exists a price function p˜ : E → R+
for which
(i) p˜(e) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , P}, for every e ∈ E, where P = nm/,
(ii) p˜(I) ≤ B(I)1+ , for every I ∈ Opt, and
(iii) p˜(Opt) ≥ (1− 2)p∗(Opt).
We shall call the set of prices p˜ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1, -
optimal prices.
We will make use of the following well-known separator result for trees.
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Proposition 2. Let T = (V,E) be a tree. Then there exists a node v (called
separator node) with the following property: Let s1, . . . , sr be the sizes of the
components obtained by deleting v from T, then there is a subset S ⊆ [r] def=
{1, . . . , r} such that
n
3
	 ≤
∑
i∈S
si ≤ 
2n3 . (2)
Such a separator can be found in linear time.
This gives a recursive partitioning of T in the following standard way: Let
v0 be a separator vertex in T and T1, . . . ,Tr be the components of T − v0.
Recursively, ﬁnd separator vertices v1, . . . vr in T1, . . . ,Tr. We say that node
v0 has level(v0) = 1, nodes v1, . . . , vr have level 2, and in general if node v is a
separator vertex in the subtree T′ obtained by deleting one-higher level separator
vertex v′ then level(v) = level(v′) + 1. By (2), the maximum number of levels k
in this decomposition is at most log3/2 n. We shall denote by N (T) the set of
separator nodes used in the full decomposition of T.
3 An O(log n) Approximation for the Tollbooth Problem
on Trees
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There is a deterministic O(log n)-approximation algorithm for Tb.
The proof goes along the same lines used in [2] to obtain an O(log n)-
approximation for the highway problem. The algorithm consists of 3 main steps:
Partitioning, “randomized cut”, and then dynamic programming. We can then
derandomize it to obtain a deterministic algorithm. We give the details below.
We say that the given set of paths I is rooted, if all the paths in I start at some
node r, called the root of T. We will also make use of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([16]). The tollbooth problem on rooted paths can be solved in poly-
nomial time using dynamic programming.
For i = 1, . . . , k, let
I(i) = {I ∈ I : i is the smallest level of a separator v ∈ N (T) contained in I}.
Then I = ∪i∈[k]I(i) and I ∩ J = ∅ for all I, J ∈ I(i) that contain distinct
separators at level i. Let (Opt, p∗) be an optimal solution. Then, p∗(Opt) =
∑k
i=1 p
∗(Opt ∩ I(i)). Thus if we solve k independent problems on each of the
sets I(i), i = 1, . . . , k, and take the solution with maximum revenue, we get
a solution of value at least p∗(Opt)/k. Thus it remains to show the following
result.
Theorem 3. Let v be a node of T, and suppose that all the paths in I go through
v. Then a solution (J , p) of expected value p(J ) ≥ p∗(Opt)/8 can be found in
polynomial time.
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Proof. Let v1, . . . , vr be the nodes adjacent to v. Note that each path I ∈ I can
be divided into two sub-paths starting at v; we denote them by I1 and I2. We
use the following procedure.
1. Let X ⊆ {v1, . . . , vr} be a subset obtained by picking each vi randomly and
independently with probability 1/2.
2. Let I ′ = {Ij : I ∈ I, j ∈ {1, 2}, Ij contains exactly one vertex of X}.
3. Use dynamic programming (cf. Theorem 2) to get an optimal solution (J , p)
on the instance deﬁned by I′ and the tree T′ with root v and sub-trees rooted
at the children in X .
4. Extend p with zeros on all the other arcs not in T′, and return (J , p).
Let (Opt, p∗) be an optimal solution. We now argue that the solution re-
turned by this algorithm has expected revenue of p∗(Opt)/8. Clearly, for every
I ∈ I, either p∗(I1) ≥ p∗(I)/2 or p∗(I2) ≥ p∗(I)/2; let us call this more prof-
itable part by I∗. Then
∑
I∈Opt p
∗(I∗) ≥ p∗(Opt)/2. Let Opt′ = {I∗ : I ∈
Opt, I contains exactly one vertex of X and this vertex lies on I∗}. Note that
with probability exactly 1/4 each I ∈ Opt has I∗ belonging to Opt′. In
particular,
E[p∗(Opt′)] =
∑
I∈Opt
E[p∗(I∗)] =
1
4
∑
I∈Opt
p∗(I∗) ≥ 18p
∗(Opt).
Since what our procedure returns is at least as proﬁtable as this quantity, the
theorem follows. unionsq
The randomized algorithm above can be derandomized using the method of
pairwise independence [19,20,2].
4 Uncrossing Paths
Here we assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V , and that paths in I
have the following uncrossing property: If I = [s, t] ∈ I then t lies on the path
[s, r]. This property implies that once paths in I meet they cannot diverge.
In the course of the solution, we shall consider the following generalized version
of the problem: Given intervals as above, and also a function h : I × Rn+ →
R+, ﬁnd J ⊆ I and a pricing p : E → R+, satisfying (1) and maximizing∑
I∈J h(I, p).
Given a price function p : E → R+ and a node w ∈ V , the accumulative
price at any node u on the path [w, r] with respect to w is deﬁned as p([w, u]).
Obviously, this monotonically increases as u moves towards the root. In this
section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. There is a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme for the
tollbooth problem with uncrossing paths.
In the following, we ﬁx K=
log(nP )/log(1+ ), where P=nm (c.f. Proposition 1).
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Definition 1. (-Relative pricings) Let w ∈ V be a given node of T, and 0 ≤
k ≤ K and 0 ≤ k′ ≤ 2 log3/2 n be given integers. We call any selection of k nodes
u1, . . . , uk ∈ V , k indices −∞ ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ K, and k′ values p1, . . . , pk′ ∈
{0, 1, . . . , nP}, such that w, u1, u2, . . . , uk, r lie on the path [w, r] in that order, an
-relative pricing w.r.t. w, and denote it by (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1, . . . ,
pk′).
The total number of possible -relative pricings with respect to a given w ∈ V
is at most
L = (d(T )K)K(nP + 1)2 log3/2 n, (3)
which is mpolylog(m) for every ﬁxed  > 0.
Definition 2. (Consistent pricings) Let R = (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1,
. . . , pk′) be an -relative pricing w.r.t. node w ∈ V , L = {s1, . . . , sk′} be the set
of separators from N (T) on the path from (w, r], and p : E → R+ be a pricing
of E. We say that R is -consistent with p and L if
(C1) for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, (1 + )ij ≤ p([w, u]) ≤ (1 + )ij+1 if u lies in the
interval [uj , uj+1) (excluding uj+1),
(C2) for j = 1, . . . , k′, p([w, sj ]) = pj.
Lemma 1. Let p˜ : E → R+ be an -optimal pricing for a given instance of Tb,
w ∈ V be an arbitrary node, and L = {s1, . . . , sk′} be the set of separators in
N (T) on the path from [w, r]. Then there exists an -relative pricing R w.r.t. w,
that is -consistent with p˜ and L.
With every -relative pricing R, we can associate a system of linear inequalities,
denoted by S(R), on a set of E variables {p(e) : e ∈ E}, consisting of the
constraints (C1) and (C2), together with the non-negativity constraints p(e) ≥ 0.
The feasible set for this system gives the set of all possible pricings with which
R is -consistent. For two systems of inequalities S1, S2, we denote by S1 ∧ S2
the system obtained by combining their inequalities.
Let R = (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1, . . . , pk′) be an -relative pricing
w.r.t. a node w ∈ V . Given an interval I ∈ I[w], we associate a value v(I, R)
to I, deﬁned with respect to R as follows: Let j(I) be the largest index such
that uij(I) is contained in I. Then, deﬁne v(I, R) = (1 + )
j(I). For a subset of
intervals I ′ ⊆ I, we deﬁne, as usual, v(I ′, R) = ∑I∈I′ v(I, R). It follows that
for any -relative pricing R w.r.t. a node w ∈ V , any p : E → R+ with which R
is consistent, and any I = [s, t] ∈ I[w], we have
v(I, R) ≤ p([w, t]) ≤ (1 + )v(I, R). (4)
Decomposition into Two Subproblems. Let w ∈ N (T) be a separator
node. Then T can be decomposed into two subtrees TL = (VL, EL) and TR =
(VR, ER), such that the root r ∈ VR and w ∈ VL ∩ VR is the root of TL. We
deﬁne two Tb instances (TL, IL) and (TR, IR) where:
I0 = {[s, t] ∈ I[w] : s ∈ VL and t ∈ VR},
IL = {[s, t] ∈ I : s, t ∈ VL} ∪ {[s, w] : [s, t] ∈ I0},
IR = {[s, t] ∈ I : s, t ∈ VR}.
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In other words, the intervals passing through w, crossing fromTL toTR are trun-
cated in TL while all other intervals remain the same1. Note that from the choice
of w, we have max{|V (TL)|, |V (TR)|} ≤ 2n3 + 1, and both instances (TL, IL)
and (TR, IR) are of the uncrossing type, with roots w and r, respectively.
The algorithm is given as Algorithm 1 below. It is initially called with an
empty S, and with h(I) = 0 for all I ∈ I. The procedure iterates over all -
relative pricings R, consistent with S, w.r.t. the middle edge e∗, then recurses
on the subsets of intervals to the left and right of e∗. Intervals crossing from TL
to TR will be truncated and their values will be charged to TL; hence the cor-
responding budgets are reduced, and the corresponding h-values are increased.
Algorithm 1. Tb(T, I, r, B, h,S)
Require: An uncrossing Tb instance (T = (V,E), I) with root r, budgets and values
B : I → R+ and h : I × Rn+ → R+, and a feasible system of inequalities S
Ensure: A pricing p : E → R+ and a subset J ⊆ I
1: if |I| = 0 then
2: S ′ ←REDUCE(S , E)
3: return (p, ∅), where p is any feasible solution of S ′
4: end if
5: if d(T) = 1 then
6: for edge e of T do
7: S ′ ←REDUCE(S , {e})
8: p(e) ← argmax{∑I∈I: p′≤B(I)(h(I) + p′) : p′ satisﬁes S ′}
9: J (e) ← {I ∈ I : B(I) ≥ p(e)}
10: end for
11: Return ((p(e) : e ∈ E),⋃e∈E J (e))
12: end if
13: Let w be a separator node of T and TL,TR, I0, IL, IR be as deﬁned above
14: for every -relative pricing R w.r.t. w for which S ∧ S(R) is feasible do
15: for I ∈ I0 do
16: B(I) ← B(I)− (1 + )v(I,R)
17: h(I) ← h(I) + v(I,R)
18: end for
19: (p1,J1) ← Tb(TL, IL, w,B, h,S)
20: (p2,J2) ← Tb(TR, IR, r, B, h,S ∧ S(R))
21: Let p be the pricing deﬁned by p(e) = p1(e) if e ∈ EL and p(e) = p1(e) if e ∈ ER
22: J ← J1 ∪ J2
23: record (p,J )
24: end for
25: Return the recorded solution with largest p(J ) + h(J ) value
Solving the Base Case. At the lowest level of recursion (either line 3 or 8), we
have to solve a linear program deﬁned by the system S. Note that the system may
1 Throughout, we will make the implicit assumption that each interval has an
“identity”; so, for instance, IL ∩I0 will be used to denote the set {I ∈ I0 : I = [s, t]
and [s, w] ∈ IL}.
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contain constraints on variables outside the current set of edges E of the current
tree T (resulting from previous nodes of the recursion tree). However, we can
reduce this LP to one that involves only variables in E. Indeed, any constraint
that involves a variable not in E, has the form L ≤ p([w, u]) ≤ U , where u ∈
V (T), and w ∈ V (T) is a separator node such that there is another separator
node w′ ∈ V (T) on the path from w to u. Then when w′ was considered in the
recursion, a constraint of the form p([w,w′)] = q, for some value q, was appended
to S (recall (C2) in the deﬁnition of consistent pricings). Now, we can replace
the ﬁrst constraint by the equivalent constraint L−q ≤ p([w′, u]) ≤ U−q, which
only involves variables from E. This is exactly what procedure REDUCE(S, ·)
does in lines 2 and 7.
When the procedure returns, we get a pricing p : E → R+ and a set of
intervals J ⊆ I which can be purchased under this pricing.
Theorem 4 follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Algorithm Tb runs in quasi-polynomial time in m, for any fixed
 > 0.
Lemma 3. For any  > 0, Algorithm Tb returns a pricing p and a set of
intervals J such that p(I) ≤ B(I) for all I ∈ J and p(J ) ≥ (1− 3)p∗(Opt).
5 Hardness of the Highway Problem
5.1 Strong NP-Hardness in the Standard Model
Recall that the highway problem is the special case of the tollbooth problem
when the underlying graph is a path. In this section, we show that the problem
is strongly NP-hard, thus ruling out the existence of an FPTAS for the problem.
Consider a MAX-2-SAT instance with n variables {x1, . . . , xn} and m clauses
{C1, . . . , Cm}. Let the variables be numbered 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 5. The highway problem is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. The proof follows by the construction of gadgets for the variables and
clauses in a given MAX-2-SAT instance. We next describe their construction.
Variable Gadget: The gadget for each variable consists of two copies of the fol-
lowing basic gadget, and a consistency gadget.
Basic Gadget: The basic gadget consists of 4 edges e1, . . . , e4, and 4 types of inter-
vals A,B,C and D. There are 4 intervals each of type A and B, labeled a1, . . . , a4,
and b1, . . . , b4 respectively. The intervals ai = bi = [ei], for i = 1, . . . , 4. The inter-
vals a1, . . . , a4 have budgets of 1, 2, 2, 1 respectively, and the intervals b1, . . . , b4
have budgets 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. There are 2 type C intervals, c1 and c2, with
c1 = [e1, e2], and c2 = [e3, e4]. These intervals have a budget of 3. There are two
intervals of type D, d1 = d2 = [e2, e3] with d1 having a budget of 4, and d2, a
budget of 2. The basic gadget is shown in Figure 1. We can show that there are
exactly two price assignments for {e1, . . . , e4} that gives us optimum proﬁt.
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e4e1 e2 e3
2 2 1
a1 a2 a3 a4
2 1 1 2
b1 b2 b3 b4
3 3
c1 c2
4
d2
2
d
A
B
C
D
1
Fig. 1. A basic gadget. The gadget consists of 4 edges, and 4 types of intervals A,B,C
and D. The interval labels are shown below each interval, and the budgets are shown
above each interval.
Lemma 4. The maximum profit that can be obtained from a basic gadget is 18,
and there are exactly two sets of prices namely (1, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 2) for the
edges (e1, . . . , e4) that achieve this profit.
The price assignment (1, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 2) to the edges e1, . . . , e4 respectively
are called TRUE and FALSE assignments respectively. The variable gadget is
constructed on 8n + 1 edges (e4n, e4n−1, . . . , e1, h, f1, . . . , f4n), where n is the
number of variables in the MAX-2-SAT instance. Each variable gadget con-
sists of two copies of the basic gadget, along with a consistency gadget. The
consistency gadget ensures that the two basic gadgets have the same price as-
signment. More formally, let (x1, . . . , xn) be an order on the variables of the
MAX-2-SAT instance. Then, the gadget for variable xi consists of two basic
gadgets, B1i and B
2
i . B
1
i consists of intervals (customers) interested in the edges
e4i−3, . . . , e4i and B2i consists of intervals interested in the edges f4i−3, . . . , f4i.
Finally, the intervals ensuring consistency of the gadget for variable xi spans
from e4i−1, . . . , f4i−3. The consistency gadget consists of a single interval that
has a budget of mn2+6(2i−2)+6. Finally, we add a new type of interval, called
a type H interval that is interested only in the edge h, and has a budget of mn2.
Figure 2 shows the arrangement of the variable gadgets. We can show that
the consistency intervals do their job, i.e., if for a variable gadget, B1i and B
2
i
have diﬀerent price assignments, we obtain a smaller proﬁt than when they are
the same.
.
 
.
 
.
. . . . . .
h
mn2 + 12 + 6
mn2 + 6
mn2
x2 x2x1 x1
H
f8e7 e6 e5e8 e4 e3 e2 e1 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7
Fig. 2. The variable gadget
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Lemma 5. The maximum profit of 2mn2 + 6(2i− 2) + 6 + 36 from a variable
gadget and the interval h is achieved only when both the basic gadgets corre-
sponding to a variable are consistent, and the type H interval purchases edge h
at a price of mn2.
We will create several copies of the basic gadgets, the consistency gadgets for
each variable as well as several copies of the H interval to ensure that in an
optimum price assignment, the basic gadgets are consistent, and the reduction
goes through. But before we do this, we describe the clause gadgets.
Clause Gadgets: The clause gadget for a clause of variables xi and xj runs
between the basic gadget B1i and B
2
j . There are four types of clause gadgets
corresponding to the four types of clauses. Each clause gadget consists of one
interval. These intervals have the property that we obtain a certain revenue
from the clause interval if and only if the clause is satisﬁed; otherwise we obtain
nothing. (See the table in Figure 3).
Clause Interval Budget
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−3] mn2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 3
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−3] mn2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−1] mn2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−1] mn2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 9
Fig. 3. This table shows the lengths and budgets of the intervals making up a clause
gadget for the four diﬀerent kinds of clauses
We say that a pricing is consistent if for every variable, the price assignment
to the two basic gadgets of the variable gadget are both TRUE or both FALSE,
and the consistency intervals spend their entire budgets.
Lemma 6. Consider a clause C consisting of variables xi and xj and a con-
sistent price assignment to the edges. Then, the intervals corresponding to C
will be able to purchase their desired edges if and only if the corresponding truth
assignment to the variables satisfies the clause C.
We now describe the ﬁnal reduction. As mentioned earlier, we have to create
copies of the variable gadget, consistency gadget and the H interval for the
proof to go through. We make T copies of each basic gadget, of each consistency
gadget, and of the H interval, where any value of T , larger than m2n3 will suﬃce
for the proof. Observe that for a variable gadget again, the proﬁt maximizing
prices achieve consistency of the variable gadget, and making T copies of the H
intervals ensures that the price of the edge h is set to mn2.
5.2 APX-Hardness in the Discount Model
When negative prices are allowed, the highway problem becomes APX-hard.
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Theorem 6. The highway problem with negative prices is APX-hard even when
restricted to instances in which one edge is shared by all the customers.
We prove the above theorem by ﬁrst showing that it is equivalent to a pricing
problem on bipartite graphs and then prove that the latter is APX-hard via
a reduction from maxcut on 3-regular graphs. The details of the proof can be
found in the extended version of this paper. This result has been independently
obtained in [18].
6 Conclusion
We presented an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the tollbooth problem
on trees, which is better than the current upper bound for the general problem.
Improving this bound is an interesting open problem. One plausible direction
towards this is to use as a subroutine, the quasi-polynomial time algorithm for
the case of uncrossing paths. Such techniques have been used before, for example
for the multicut problem on trees [14]. However, it is unclear how a general
instance of the Tb problem can be decomposed into a set of problems of the
uncrossing type. For the highway problem, the strong NP-hardness presented
in this paper shows that the problem is almost closed, modulo improving the
running time from quasi-polynomial to polynomial. When negative prices are
allowed, somewhat surprisingly, the problem becomes harder, and even a quasi-
PTAS is unlikely to exist.
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